Prize formation and sharing in multi-stage contests

DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01407-zOpenAlexW4207052701MaRDI QIDQ2683486

Vladimir P. Petkov

Publication date: 10 February 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01407-z

zbMATH Keywords

multi-stage contestsmixed-strategy equilibriumendogenous prizesprize sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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