Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-battle contests

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.05.008zbMath1393.91081OpenAlexW3124602818MaRDI QIDQ2013361

Alan Gelder, Dan Kovenock

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/economic-science-institute/_files/WorkingPapers/dynamic_behavior_player_types_2016_wp.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentmaximinescalationall-pay auctiondynamic contestlast standmulti-battle contestplayer type

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Prize formation and sharing in multi-stage contests ⋮ Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: experimental evidence

Cites Work

• A Signed-Rank Test for Clustered Data
• From Custer to Thermopylae: last stand behavior in multi-stage contests
• Multi-battle contests
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• An experimental study of decisions in dynamic optimization problems
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• Bimodal bidding in experimental all-pay auctions
• Racing with Uncertainty
• Bargaining and Reputation: An Experiment on Bargaining in the Presence of Behavioural Types
• Rank-Sum Tests for Clustered Data

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