Dynamic models of conflicts. III: Hierarchical games
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Publication:747330
DOI10.1134/S000511791502006XzbMATH Open1406.91074MaRDI QIDQ747330FDOQ747330
Authors: M. A. Gorelov, A. F. Kononenko
Publication date: 23 October 2015
Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- Sustainability of intertwined supply networks: a game-theoretic approach
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