Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.10.003zbMath1388.91113OpenAlexW2770776033MaRDI QIDQ684159

Jun Xiao

Publication date: 9 February 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

uniqueasymmetriccontest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Assortative matching by lottery contests ⋮ Constrained contests with a continuum of battles ⋮ Ability grouping in contests ⋮ The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes ⋮ Your failure is my opportunity -- effects of elimination in contests

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
• Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
• Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Sequential two-prize contests
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
• Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
• All-Pay Contests
• Large Contests

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