Payoff shares in two-player contests

DOI10.3390/G7030025MaRDI QIDQ725037zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Samuel Häfner, Georg Nöldeke

Publication date 1 August 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g7030025

zbMATH Keywords

contestspure-strategy equilibriumrent-dissipation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

Summary: In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players' shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper, we consider contests with two players and investigate the relationship between these equilibrium shares and the parameters of a class of asymmetric Tullock contest success functions. Our main finding is that any players' shares that sum up to less than one can arise as the unique outcome of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for appropriate parameters.

Recommendations

• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results
• All-Pay Contests
• Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information
• Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes

Cites work

• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
• Contest success functions
• Contest success functions: an extension
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• Strategy and dynamics in contests

Cited in

(6)

• All-pay contests with performance spillovers
• A tug-of-war team contest
• Contests for catch shares
• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Sad-loser contests
• Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results

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