A model of a two-stage all-pay auction
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2452808
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.12.002zbMATH Open1291.91081OpenAlexW3124760139MaRDI QIDQ2452808FDOQ2452808
Publication date: 5 June 2014
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.12.002
Recommendations
- An all-pay auction with a pure-strategy equilibrium
- A model of sequential auctions
- Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
- A steady-state model of the continuous double auction
- Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
- A game-theory model of a one-sided auction
- Second-price all-pay auctions and best-reply matching equilibria
- Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria
- A model of rational competitive bidding
- Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
Cites Work
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Contest architecture
- Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
- All-Pay Contests
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Contests with multiple rounds
- Multi-battle contests
- The optimal multi-stage contest
- Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
- Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
- Sequential two-prize contests
- Biased procurement auctions
- Equilibria of a two-person non-zerosum noisy game of timing
- The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
- The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests
- Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
- Contests with a stochastic number of players
- Sabotaging potential rivals
Cited In (4)
This page was built for publication: A model of a two-stage all-pay auction
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2452808)
