A model of a two-stage all-pay auction

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.12.002zbMath1291.91081OpenAlexW3124760139MaRDI QIDQ2452808

Daisuke Hirata

Publication date: 5 June 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.12.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Keep on fighting: the dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions ⋮ Task arrangement in team competitions ⋮ Competitive balance when winning breeds winners

Cites Work

• Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
• The optimal multi-stage contest
• Sequential two-prize contests
• Sabotaging potential rivals
• Biased procurement auctions
• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests
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• Contests with a stochastic number of players
• Equilibria of a two-person non-zerosum noisy game of timing
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
• The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
• Contests with multiple rounds
• Contest architecture
• Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
• Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
• All-Pay Contests

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