A model of a two-stage all-pay auction

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.12.002MaRDI QIDQ2452808zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daisuke Hirata

Publication date 5 June 2014

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.12.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• All-Pay Contests
• Biased procurement auctions
• Contest architecture
• Contests with a stochastic number of players
• Contests with multiple rounds
• Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Equilibria of a two-person non-zerosum noisy game of timing
• Multi-battle contests
• Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
• Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
• Sabotaging potential rivals
• Sequential two-prize contests
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests
• The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
• The optimal multi-stage contest
• Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

Cited in

(7)

• Information architecture and its impact on the equilibrium for all-pay auction models
• Task arrangement in team competitions
• Keep on fighting: the dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions
• Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders
• Sequential elimination in multi-stage all-pay auctions
• Competitive balance when winning breeds winners
• Best-of-three all-pay auctions

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