Second-price all-pay auctions and best-reply matching equilibria

DOI10.1142/S0219198919400097MaRDI QIDQ4968308zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Gisèle Umbhauer

Publication date 12 July 2019

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198919400097

zbMATH Keywords

best-reply matchingclassroom experimentNash equilibriumsecond-price all-pay auctionwar of attrition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria
• Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction

Cites work

• A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching.
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Game theory and exercises
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
• The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information

Cited in

(4)

• A model of a two-stage all-pay auction
• Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria
• Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
• Second-price auctions with private entry costs

This page was built for publication: Second-price all-pay auctions and best-reply matching equilibria

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4968308)