Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria

DOI10.1142/9789811202018_0009MaRDI QIDQ3299263zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gisèle Umbhauer

Publication date 22 July 2020

Published in Game Theoretic Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://univoak.eu/islandora/object/islandora%3A115131

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumwar of attritionsecond-price all-pay auctionbest-reply matchingclassroom experiment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

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Cited in

(3)

• Second-price all-pay auctions and best-reply matching equilibria
• The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes
• A model of a two-stage all-pay auction

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