Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
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Publication:854940
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.02.008zbMATH Open1141.91410OpenAlexW3021532329MaRDI QIDQ854940FDOQ854940
Authors: Guofu Tan, Okan Yilankaya
Publication date: 7 December 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.008
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)
Cites Work
Cited In (34)
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- What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach
- Participation in auctions
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