Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9092-9zbMath1177.91080OpenAlexW2082241624MaRDI QIDQ1025649

Jingfeng Lu

Publication date: 19 June 2009

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9092-9

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian Nash equilibriumentry costsendogenous entryefficient auctionsecond price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Participation constraints in the Vickrey auction
• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
• Auction design with opportunity cost
• Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
• Mid-auction information acquisition
• Participation costs and efficient auctions
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Optimal auctions revisited

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