Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs
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Publication:2457243
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Cites work
- A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Bidder collusion
- Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
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