Biased mediation: selection and effectiveness

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2025.106069MaRDI QIDQ6912009zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jin Yeub Kim, Jong Jae Lee

Publication date 23 October 2025

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2025.106069

zbMATH Keywords

biased mediationconflictmechanism designmediator selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites work

• Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
• Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types
• Mediation and peace
• Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs
• Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement

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