Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Mechanism design with collusive supervision
- Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty
- Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
- Optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints
- Robust trading mechanisms
- Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
- Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- Efficiency and adverse selection
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
- A dominant strategy double auction
- A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
- Aggregation, determinacy, and informational efficiency for a class of economies with asymmetric information
- Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
- Efficiency in correlated equilibrium
- Starting small and renegotiation
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
- Cooperative processing of information via choice at an information set
- Fully endogenous mechanism selection on finite outcome sets
- A coalition proof equilibrium for a private information credit economy
- A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects
- The possibility of speculative trade between dynamically consistent agents.
- The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
- Limits of markets and limits of governments: an introduction to a symposium on political economy
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
- Ex post Nash equilibrium in linear Bayesian games for decision making in multi-environments
- Solutions for bargaining games with incomplete information: general type space and action space
- Agreeing to disagree and dilation
- On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
- (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
- Status quo bias in bargaining: an extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with an application to the Coase theorem.
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
- The core of economies with asymmetric information: An axiomatic approach.
- Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information
- Information revelation and efficiency in auctions
- Mixed complementarity problems for robust optimization equilibrium in bimatrix game.
- Information-based trade
- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
- On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments
- Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- Optimal mechanism for land acquisition
- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
- Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
- Stable unions
- A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information
- Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
- Ambiguity and price competition
- Discrete approximation of two-stage stochastic and distributionally robust linear complementarity problems
- Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
- Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information
- Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies
- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
- Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
- Information transmission in coalitional voting games
- Limited observability as a constraint in contract design
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
- Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
- Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs
- Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints
- Modeling dynamic sealed-offer \(k\)-double auctions using a mixture of distributions
- Robust game theory
- Incomplete information, credibility and the core
- Debt contracts and cooperative improvements
- Policy discrimination with and without interpersonal comparisons of utility
- Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality
- Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems
- Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
- AMBIGUITY AND PORTFOLIO INERTIA
- Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion
- Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
- Mixed complementarity problems for robust optimization equilibrium under \(l_1\cap l_\infty\)-norm
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
- Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
- What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
- Pareto efficiency and identity
- On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information
- Incentive compatible market design with applications
- Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
- Stability with one-sided incomplete information
- Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design
- Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two-alternative case
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules
- Efficiency and endogenous fertility
- Implementation under ambiguity
- Interim third-party selection in bargaining
- Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem
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