The possibility of speculative trade between dynamically consistent agents.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00044-7MaRDI QIDQ1420523zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yoram Halevy

Publication date 2 February 2004

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3195782 (Why is no real title available?)
• A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability
• A Theory of Disappointment Aversion
• Agreeing to disagree
• Betweenness satisfying preferences and dynamic choice
• Consequentialist foundations for expected utility
• Decomposable choice under uncertainty
• Dynamically consistent beliefs must be Bayesian
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• On the logic of ``agreeing to disagree type results

Cited in

(7)

• Agreeing to disagree and dilation
• Speculation under unawareness
• ``Agreeing to disagree type results under ambiguity
• Learning (to disagree?) in large worlds
• Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty
• Information-based trade
• Bayesian learning with multiple priors and nonvanishing ambiguity

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