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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3958314 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48344 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1103105 (Why is no real title available?)
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- A no-trade theorem under Knightian uncertainty with general preferences
- Agreeing to disagree
- Consensus, communication and knowledge: an extension with Bayesian agents
- Dilation for sets of probabilities
- Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty
- Invariance properties of density ratio priors
- Knightian decision theory. I.
- Learning to agree
- Nonconglomerability for countably additive measures that are not \(\kappa\)-additive
- On the logic of ``agreeing to disagree type results
- Reaching a Consensus
- Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
- The extent of non-conglomerability of finitely additive probabilities
- The logical foundations of statistical inference
- The possibility of speculative trade between dynamically consistent agents.
- We can't disagree forever
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