Cooperative processing of information via choice at an information set

DOI10.1007/BF01240180zbMath0803.90138OpenAlexW2069581376MaRDI QIDQ1327071

Jingang Zhao, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Adam Idzik

Publication date: 11 July 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240180

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibriumBayesian society

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
• The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game
• Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Cooperative processing of information via choice at an information set