Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies
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Publication:2365094
DOI10.1007/BF01803951zbMath0871.90119MaRDI QIDQ2365094
Publication date: 9 March 1997
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
incomplete information; revelation principle; Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium; Bayesian society; Bayesian strong equilibrium
91A12: Cooperative games
Related Items
Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans, Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete, A note on the incentive compatible core, Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core, Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information, Cooperative processing of information via choice at an information set, Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey., \(Interim\) core concepts for a Bayesian pure exchange economy, Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games, Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores, Market games with asymmetric information: the core, Incomplete information, credibility and the core
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