Equilibrium Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information

DOI10.2307/1911926MaRDI QIDQ3902866zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takao Kobayashi

Publication date 1980

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5d7cf1e09188012d196fa30cb03840fe3c3c1350

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgecoredecision ruledifferential informationequilibrium contractsinformation exchangerisk sharing rulesyndicates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Group preferences (91B10)

Cited in

(14)

• Pooling, pricing and trading of risks
• Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• The core of an economy with differential information
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information.
• The core of economies with asymmetric information: An axiomatic approach.
• An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information
• Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: The core
• Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies
• Market games with asymmetric information: the core
• On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information
• Private value allocations in large economies with differential information
• Private information, transferable utility, and the core

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