An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.03.005zbMATH Open1319.91014arXiv1903.09867OpenAlexW2071912637MaRDI QIDQ2348003FDOQ2348003

Authors: Y. Askoura 

Publication date: 10 June 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We consider the interim core of normal form cooperative games and exchange economies with incomplete information based on the partition model. We develop a solution concept that we can situate roughly between Wilson's coarse core and Yannelis's private core. We investigate the interim negotiation of contracts and address the two situations of contract delivery: interim and ex post. Our solution differs from Wilson's concept because the measurability of strategies in our solution is postponed until the consumption date (assumed with respect to the information that will be known by the players at the consumption date). For interim consumption, our concept differs from Yannelis's private core because players can negotiate conditional on proper common knowledge events in our solution, which strengthens the interim aspect of the game, as we will illustrate with examples.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.09867

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zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationprivate corecoarse corefine corepartition model\(\alpha\)-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cited In (22)

• Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
• Existence of \(\alpha\)-cores for games without compact assumptions
• On the \(\alpha\)-core of set payoffs games
• Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players
• A weak \(\alpha \)-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents
• A weak \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem of generalized games with infinitely many players and pseudo-utilities
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Competitive equilibria and benefit distributions of population production economies with external increasing returns
• The weak \(\alpha\)-core of exchange economies with a continuum of players and pseudo-utilities
• Essential stability of cooperative equilibria for population games
• Deviations, uncertainty and the core
• Some generalizations of Zhao's theorem: hybrid solutions and weak hybrid solutions for games with nonordered preferences
• A social coalitional weak equilibrium existence theorem with a continuum of agents and applications
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players
• Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: finite-coalition \(\alpha\)-cores and weak \(\alpha\)-cores
• A coalitional extension of generalized fuzzy games
• NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies
• The weak hybrid equilibria of an exchange economy with a continuum of agents and externalities
• Existence of weakly cooperative equilibria for infinite-leader-infinite-follower games
• Existence and continuity theorems of \(\alpha\)-core of multi-leader-follower games with set payoffs

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