An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information
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Publication:2348003
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.03.005zbMath1319.91014arXiv1903.09867OpenAlexW2071912637MaRDI QIDQ2348003
Publication date: 10 June 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.09867
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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