Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies
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Publication:1374882
Recommendations
- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
- Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
- Incentive compatibility with interdependent preferences
- Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies
Cited in
(47)- Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and with infinitely many commodities
- Special issue: Differential information economics
- Optimal allocations in growth models with private information
- Efficiency and Mechanisms with no Regret
- Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies
- Bayesian-Walrasian equilibria: Beyond the rational expectations equilibrium
- A dual characterization of incentive efficiency.
- Debt contracts and cooperative improvements
- Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
- Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans
- Differential information economies
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- Asset market equilibrium with short-selling and differential information
- Economic efficiency requires interaction
- Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
- A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications
- Incentive compatibility with interdependent preferences
- Large economies with differential information and without free disposal
- A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies
- Information and the divergence between willingness to accept and willingness to pay
- Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information
- Core and equilibria under ambiguity
- Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies
- Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty.
- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
- Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
- Aggregation, determinacy, and informational efficiency for a class of economies with asymmetric information
- A note on the incentive compatible core
- Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries
- Posterior efficiency
- A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility
- On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium
- On efficiency in disagreement economies
- Market games with asymmetric information: the core
- Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5050006 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
- On the interactions of incentive and information structures
- \(Interim\) core concepts for a Bayesian pure exchange economy
- On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information
- An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information
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