Posterior efficiency

DOI10.1006/GAME.1994.1013MaRDI QIDQ1319962zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Françoise Forges

Publication date 21 April 1994

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1013

zbMATH Keywords

efficiency in Bayesian collective-choice problemsposterior-efficient mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(13)

• Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
• Debt contracts and cooperative improvements
• The role of commitment in bilateral trade
• Efficiency in correlated equilibrium
• A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies
• Optimal delay in committees
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
• Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
• Signaling, screening, and core stability
• Group stability in matching with interdependent values
• Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem

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