Signaling, screening, and core stability

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105715MaRDI QIDQ6090450zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yusuke Kamishiro, Rajiv Vohra, Roberto Serrano

Publication date 17 November 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105715

zbMATH Keywords

coreincomplete informationNash programperfect Bayesian equilibriumscreeningsignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information
• A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
• Bargaining and Value
• Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies
• Game theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3775297 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• Incomplete information, credibility and the core
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Information transmission in coalitional voting games
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
• Non-cooperative implementation of the core
• Order independent equilibria
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Posterior efficiency
• Reinterpreting the kernel
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
• Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
• The core of a monetary economy without trust
• The core of economies with asymmetric information: An axiomatic approach.
• The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information
• Transferable utility games with uncertainty
• Two-person bargaining with verifiable information
• Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information

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