Non-cooperative implementation of the core

DOI10.1007/S003550050084MaRDI QIDQ1374817zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra

Publication date 11 December 1997

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050084

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cited in

(37)

• The optimal design of a market
• A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information
• An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
• Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation
• A simple noncooperative core story
• Non-cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies
• A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
• The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
• Implementation of bargaining sets via simple mechanisms
• Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
• A non-cooperative axiomatization of the core
• Bargaining and bargaining sets.
• A market to implement the core
• Solving coalitional resource games
• Bilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo
• The recursive core for non-superadditive games
• Information transmission in coalitional voting games
• Trade through endogenous intermediaries
• Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties
• Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
• Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
• Implementation of the core in college admissions problems when colleagues matter
• Nash-implementation of pareto correspondence in cooperative economies
• Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• Cooperative Games
• Implementation theory
• Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
• Signaling, screening, and core stability
• Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
• Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence
• A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown
• Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
• Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
• Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information

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