A market to implement the core
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Recommendations
Cited in
(24)- Implementing the core of a two-person pure allocation game without free disposal or integer games
- A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation
- Reinterpreting the kernel
- A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Implementation of bargaining sets via simple mechanisms
- A simple selling and buying procedure
- Incompatibility between stability and consistency
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- Every member of the core is as respectful as any other
- A market interpretation of the proportional extended core
- Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties
- Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
- Testable implications of the core in TU market games
- Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
- Transparency, complementarity and holdout
- Cooperative Games
- Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
- Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core
- A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games
- The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information
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