Implementation of bargaining sets via simple mechanisms
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099365 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3214144 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
- A \(2 \times 2\) game without the fictitious play property
- A consistent bargaining set
- A market to implement the core
- A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
- An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
- An existence theorem for a bargaining set
- Convergent Transfer Schemes for N-Person Games
- Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games
- Non-cooperative implementation of the core
- On the least core and the Mas-Colell bargaining set
- Stable Sets and Stable Points of Set-Valued Dynamic Systems with Applications to Game Theory
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- Two characterizations of bargaining sets
Cited in
(7)- A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set
- Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- A noncooperative interpretation of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- Simple multi-party set reconciliation
- The demand bargaining set: General characterization and application to majority games
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