Nash implementation and the bargaining problem
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Publication:2385067
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0208-xzbMath1280.91087OpenAlexW2159383068MaRDI QIDQ2385067
Publication date: 11 October 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0208-x
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (4)
On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions
Cites Work
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