Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.01.008MaRDI QIDQ2306263zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hideki Mizukami, Takuma Wakayama

Publication date 20 March 2020

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.01.008

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining problembargaining solutiondictatorial solutiondominant strategy implementationwelfarism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

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• A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3079001 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Non-bossiness
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• The bargaining problem

Cited in

(2)

• Dominant strategy implementation in multi-unit allocation problems
• Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies

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