Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games
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Cites work
- A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
- An \(N\)-person pure bargaining game
- An arbitration game and the egalitarian bargaining solution
- Bargaining and Value
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1194817 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226098 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
- Multilateral Bargaining
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Reinterpreting the kernel
- The bargaining problem
- The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
Cited in
(9)- Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets
- Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces
- A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case
- Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory.
- On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
- Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium
- Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
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