A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
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Cites work
- A consistent bargaining set
- A market to implement the core
- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
- An arbitration game and the egalitarian bargaining solution
- An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
- Bargaining and Value
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3214144 (Why is no real title available?)
- Multilateral Bargaining
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Non-cooperative implementation of the core
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
Cited in
(20)- Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets
- Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games
- Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case
- Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory.
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
- Nash implementation and the bargaining problem
- Nash-implementation of pareto correspondence in cooperative economies
- UNIQUE NASH IMPLEMENTATION FOR A CLASS OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS
- An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution
- Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium
- Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
- Robust group manipulation with indifferences
- Nash smoothing on the test bench: H_-essential equilibria
- Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
- Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers
- Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games
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