A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00064-5MaRDI QIDQ1391059zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Roberto Serrano

Publication date 22 July 1998

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00064-5

zbMATH Keywords

Nash programimplementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory.
• A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3214144 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• A consistent bargaining set
• A market to implement the core
• An arbitration game and the egalitarian bargaining solution
• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• Bargaining and Value
• Multilateral Bargaining
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Non-cooperative implementation of the core
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

Cited in

(16)

• Nash-implementation of pareto correspondence in cooperative economies
• Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
• UNIQUE NASH IMPLEMENTATION FOR A CLASS OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS
• An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers
• Nash implementation and the bargaining problem
• Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory.
• An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution
• Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets
• Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium
• Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
• Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games
• Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces
• On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
• Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games

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