Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
- Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
- The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
- Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
- Decreasing serial cost sharing under economies of scale
- Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive
- An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money
- Order independence for iterated weak dominance
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
- Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable
- Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
- Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies
- Strategy-proof risk sharing
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
- Strategyproofness, non-bossiness and group strategyproofness in a cost sharing model
- Hierarchical allocation
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
- Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies
- Peter J. Hammond
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
- Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies
- Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions
- Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
- Overlapping multiple object assignments
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
- The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game
- Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: characterization in the two-agent case
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
- Menu mechanisms
- School choice with preference rank classes
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly
- Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
- Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach
- Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms
- Hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks
- The complexity of computing the random priority allocation matrix
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
- Non-bossy social classification
- A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems
- Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
- Secure implementation in production economies
- Social Choice Theory
- Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization
- Strategy-proof coalition formation
- Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing
- Irrationality-proofness: markets versus games
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
- Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- House allocation with transfers
- Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies
- Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
- Selecting a winner with external referees
- Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: an impossibility result
- Characterization of \textit{maxmed} mechanisms for multiple objects
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
- Incentive compatibility without compensation
- Non-bossiness
- Transparent matching mechanisms
- Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned
- Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices
- Compatibility between stability and strategy-proofness: a single-peaked preferences investigation
- Ordinal simplicity in discrete mechanism design
- Efficiency in multiple-type housing markets
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
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