Transparent matching mechanisms
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Cites work
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Constrained school choice
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Credible auctions: a trilemma
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles
- On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The cutoff structure of top trading cycles in school choice
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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