On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.110239MaRDI QIDQ2126158zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 14 April 2022

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110239

zbMATH Keywords

fixed priority top trading cyclesindivisible goodsobvious strategy-proofnessoutside options

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
• Matching with single-peaked preferences
• Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles
• On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof

Cited in

(6)

• On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
• Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles
• Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: a new characterization
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• Transparent matching mechanisms
• The strong core of housing markets with partial order preferences

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