Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.11.008MaRDI QIDQ417718zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Taro Kumano, Masahiro Watabe

Publication date 14 May 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.008

zbMATH Keywords

deferred acceptance algorithmdominant strategy implementationmultiple equilibriastabilityweak nonbossiness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm
• Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted
• Axioms for deferred acceptance
• An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
• Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities

Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• College admissions with affirmative action
• Constrained school choice
• Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
• Implementation of college admission rules
• Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
• Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm

Cited in

(8)

• Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted
• Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists
• Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
• Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
• On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options
• Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm
• Elimination of dominated strategies and inessential players
• Dominant strategy implementation of the doctor-optimal stable rule with bilateral contracts

This page was built for publication: Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q417718)