Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.04.036zbMATH Open1394.91304OpenAlexW2346583360MaRDI QIDQ1668286FDOQ1668286

Authors: Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn 

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.036

Recommendations

• Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
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• Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
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zbMATH Keywords

matchingstabilityNash equilibriacomplete lists

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Gale-Shapley stable marriage problem revisited: strategic issues and applications
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
• Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists
• Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare

Cited In (5)

• Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
• Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists
• Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm
• Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
• Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm

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