Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.036zbMath1394.91304OpenAlexW2346583360MaRDI QIDQ1668286

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.036

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingNash equilibriacomplete lists

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists

Cites Work

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• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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