Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90050-UzbMath0747.90008OpenAlexW2078929198MaRDI QIDQ1178254

Lin Zhou

Publication date: 26 June 1992

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90050-u

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingdeferred acceptance algorithmmarriage problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Individual preferences (91B08) Computational methods for problems pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-08)

Related Items (4)

Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists ⋮ Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods ⋮ In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm ⋮ Algorithmic Aspects of Equilibria of Stable Marriage Model with Complete Preference Lists

Cites Work

• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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