In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
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Publication:705854
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.007zbMath1117.91410OpenAlexW2167392224MaRDI QIDQ705854
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.007
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