Optimal truncation in matching markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.005zbMath1302.91154OpenAlexW1973120893MaRDI QIDQ485816

Peter Coles, Ran I. Shorrer

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://scholar.harvard.edu/ran/node/89386

zbMATH Keywords

truncationmatchingmarket designdeferred acceptancemanipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (10)

Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules ⋮ On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Varying the number of signals in matching markets ⋮ Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets ⋮ Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor ⋮ Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching ⋮ Optimal truncation in matching markets ⋮ Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable ⋮ Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: theory and experiment

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