Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.004zbMath1292.91135MaRDI QIDQ2442854

Nadja Dwenger, Alexander Westkamp, Dorothea Kübler, Sebastian Braun

Publication date: 1 April 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000E-7FFA-C

zbMATH Keywords

experiment; Boston mechanism; college admissions; quotas; Gale-Shapley mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A90: Experimental studies

91B68: Matching models

Related Items

Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints, Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas, Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match, Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution, On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice, Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications, Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms, Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments, Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study, Parallel markets in school choice

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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