Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2442854
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.004zbMath1292.91135MaRDI QIDQ2442854
Nadja Dwenger, Alexander Westkamp, Dorothea Kübler, Sebastian Braun
Publication date: 1 April 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000E-7FFA-C
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A90: Experimental studies
91B68: Matching models
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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