Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
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Publication:863276
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.12.007zbMATH Open1154.91387OpenAlexW2151413871MaRDI QIDQ863276FDOQ863276
Authors: Timothy N. Cason, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Tomas Sjöström, Takehiko Yamato 
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79711/
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- Are Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Attainable?
- An experimental evaluation of the serial cost sharing rule
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Cited In (27)
- Risk-averse and self-interested shifts in groups in both median and random rules
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- Ex post implementation
- The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison
- A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions
- The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
- Monotone strategyproofness
- On the implementation of the median
- Secure implementation in production economies
- Strategic behavior in regressions: an experimental study
- Secure implementation in allotment economies
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
- Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
- Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
- Spite and reciprocity in auctions
- Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
- Implementation via approval mechanisms
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design
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