Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
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Publication:863276
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.007zbMath1154.91387OpenAlexW2151413871MaRDI QIDQ863276
Timothy N. Cason, Tomas Sjöström, Takehiko Yamato, Tatsuyoshi Saijo
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79711/
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Uses Software
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