How robust is laboratory gift exchange?

DOI10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026979.14590.3CMaRDI QIDQ702160zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gary Charness, John H. Kagel, Guillaume R. Fréchette

Publication date 17 January 2005

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/b:exec.0000026979.14590.3c

zbMATH Keywords

framingGift exchangerobustness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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