An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions

DOI10.1007/S10058-013-0151-0MaRDI QIDQ2254236zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Katsuhiko Nishizaki

Publication date 4 February 2015

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0151-0

zbMATH Keywords

full implementability in truthful strategiesLeontief utility functionpure exchange economysecure implementabilitystrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

• Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
• Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Secure implementation in allotment economies
• Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
• Secure implementation in production economies
• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
• Strategy-Proof Exchange

Cited in

(4)

• Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
• Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
• Secure implementation in production economies
• Strategy-proof mechanism design with boundedly rational agents: theory and experiment

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