Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
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Recommendations
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
- Implementation with partial verification
- The Limits of ex post Implementation
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment
Cites work
- A course in game theory.
- A crash course in implementation theory
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Exact implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation with evidence
- Implementation with partial provability
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Robust dynamic implementation
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
Cited in
(6)- Implementation with partial verification
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
- Endogenous verifiability and optimality in agency
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6519655 (Why is no real title available?)
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