Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions (Q2235090)

This study investigates the unique implementation of social choice functions in iterative dominance in the ex-post term. The equilibrium concept adopted is an iteratively undominated strategy in the ex-post term. Partial ex-post verifiability is assumed. A dynamic mechanism of information acquisition and revelation is designed. In this construction, restrictions such as boundedness, permission of only tiny transfers off the equilibrium path, and no permission of transfers on the equilibrium path can be imposed. Based on this dynamic procedure a condition on the state space, termed full detection, is introduced. Full detection requires the ex-post verifiable information to detect only a limited class of players' lies. However, the elimination of these detected lies can help in turn detect another class of lies. By using this chain of detection, all possible lies are detected. Using this, it is shown that full detection is generally sufficient for unique implementation via iterative dominance.