Strategy-Proof Exchange
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- Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
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- Divide-and-permute
- Strategy-proofness and markets
- Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
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- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- Joint misrepresentation with bribes
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
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- The incentive ratio in exchange economies
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Exchange Design and Efficiency
- Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4081246 (Why is no real title available?)
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
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- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Robust mechanism design of exchange
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- Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
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- Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies
- Achieving the maximum size for exchange problems with dichotomous preferences
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Non-bossiness
- On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: a full characterization
- Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned
- Ordinal simplicity in discrete mechanism design
- Strategy-proof location on a network
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem
- Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
- Nonbossy mechanisms: mechanism design robust to secondary goals
- The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity
- Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
- Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
- Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
- A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production
- Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Sharing a resource with concave benefits
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
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