Manipulation through bribes
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Cites work
- A First Course in Optimization Theory
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3186512 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentives in Teams
- Manipulations by coalitions under asymmetric information: The case of Groves mechanisms
- On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games
Cited in
(34)- Path auctions with multiple edge ownership
- On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
- Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
- Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
- Manipulations in contests
- Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
- Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
- Bribing the Self
- Self-rejecting mechanisms
- Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
- Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
- Incentives in landing slot problems
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
- No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
- Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
- Joint misrepresentation with bribes
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
- Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
- Manufacturing Consent
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
- Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
- Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
- Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: the role of tie-breaking rules
- Non-bossiness
- Robust group manipulation with indifferences
- Characterizing group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
- The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity
- Cracking down on bribery
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