Joint misrepresentation with bribes
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Publication:2634138
DOI10.1007/s00199-014-0819-xzbMath1367.91092OpenAlexW2061052488MaRDI QIDQ2634138
Publication date: 8 February 2016
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0819-x
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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