Joint misrepresentation with bribes

DOI10.1007/s00199-014-0819-xzbMath1367.91092OpenAlexW2061052488MaRDI QIDQ2634138

Nanyang Bu

Publication date: 8 February 2016

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0819-x

zbMATH Keywords

assigning objects with transfersposted-price rulesstrong group strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement

Cites Work

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• Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• House allocation with transfers

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