Characterizing group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money
From MaRDI portal
Cites work
- A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing
- Collusion-proof and fair auctions
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343724 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Joint misrepresentation with bribes
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation through bribes
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal collusion-proof auctions
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
- Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
Cited in
(3)- Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money
- Strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with hard budget constraints and income effects
- Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money
This page was built for publication: Characterizing group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6960121)
