Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money

DOI10.1007/S00182-025-00977-9MaRDI QIDQ6850266zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hiroki Shinozaki

Publication date 3 March 2026

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00182-025-00977-9

zbMATH Keywords

collusioncombinatorial auctionsshutting-out-proofnesssubstitutes conditionVickrey rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites work

• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer
• Bidder collusion
• Characterizing group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money
• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Corruption and auctions
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Optimal collusion-proof auctions
• Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: the role of tie-breaking rules
• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• The vulnerability of auctions to bidder collusion
• Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions

This page was built for publication: Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6850266)