The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility

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Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
A dictatorial domain for monotone social choice functions
Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules
Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations
Private information in large economies
Structural instability of the core
Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints
Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
A new approach to the implementation problem
The manipulability of the Shapley-value
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
On the types of information and mechanism design
Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply
Stopping agents from ``cheating
Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
Product variety and competitive discounts
A control-theoretic view on incentives
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
On the robustness of strategy proof mechanisms
Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
Weakly implementable social choice rules
Limitations of the revelation principle
Characterization of desirable information processing and decision making systems in organization
Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof
Repeated implementation
Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive
Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
An alternative proof of the Hurwicz (1972) impossibility theorem
A collective tournament
A unified framework for implementation and the revelation principle
Stimulation and decision-making in the active system theory. Review of problems and new results
Strategy-proof allotment rules
Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
A lemons market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers
Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation
On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
On the interaction between asymmetric demand signal and forecast accuracy information
Revisiting minimum-quality standards
Protective behavior in matching models
Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
Strategyproofness, non-bossiness and group strategyproofness in a cost sharing model
Incentive mechanisms for international public goods under uncertainty of production costs
Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness
Superdictatorial domains for monotonic social choice functions
Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case with transferable utility
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games
Peter J. Hammond
Bridging bargaining theory with the regulation of a natural monopoly
Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers
Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
Primary versus secondary infrastructure capacity allocation mechanisms
Stable preference aggregation with infinite population
Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
Heterogeneous suppliers' contract design in assembly systems with asymmetric information
Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
Markets for public decision-making
Introduction to computer science and economic theory
A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm
Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
The return function: a new computable perspective on Bayesian-Nash equilibria
On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: characterization in the two-agent case
Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
Mechanism design with a restricted action space
Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
Cooperative production under diminishing marginal returns: interpreting fixed-path methods
Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
Tax systems and direct mechanisms in large finite economies
Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
When is a semi-honest secure multiparty computation valuable?

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