Peter J. Hammond

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_12zbMATH Open1482.01025OpenAlexW3150573741MaRDI QIDQ2064136FDOQ2064136

Authors: Philippe Mongin 

Publication date: 5 January 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_12

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zbMATH Keywords

interview

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Biographies, obituaries, personalia, bibliographies (01A70) Welfare economics (91B15)

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Cited In (3)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Peter J. Landin (1930--2009)
• Ronald J. Patton [People in Control]

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